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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
"In the assessment of damages .. much discretion must be left to the
judge or jury, while in other cases they have none, but are bound to give
such damages .. as will fully indemnify the creditors. '22 Basically then,
damages should equal the loss sustained, and where the damage is certain,
but the pecuniary value of the damages are not, much discretion is left
to the trier of fact.2
3
Recently, where the father of the deceased paid numerous bills (such
as hospital and funeral costs) but did not claim against deceased's minor
son, the court held that the "minor child ... [had] not suffered any loss
or been damaged in any way in the amount of these bills, and for this
reason recovery should not be permitted.
24
It appears that certainly nowhere in the Louisiana Civil Code, or in any
of the cases, is there anything which even borders on the area of sug-
gesting a consideration of the "divorce rate, the percentage of remar-
riages of widows, particularly to second husbands whose earnings are
greater than those of the first,"' 25 insofar as calculation of "loss of sup-
port" is concerned. Rather than allowing it to become a precedant, there-
fore, it would seem best to treat this "sociological decision" as a derelict
in the stream of law.
22 Block v. McGuire, 18 La. App. 417 (1866).
23 Duree v. State, 96 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 1957).
24 Andrus, Tutrix v. White, 236 La. 28, 33, 106 So. 2d 705, 707 (1958). Contra, Ay-
mond v. Western Union, 151 La. 184, 91 So. 671 (1922), wherein, the parent of a four-
teen year old boy who was not assisting his father in any way, but on the contrary, was
dependent upon him, was awarded $5,000.00.
25 Brown v. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So. 2d 891, 895 (1960).
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ALIMONY DOES NOT
TERMINATE WITH HUSBAND'S DEATH
On July 7, 1937, the plaintiff obtained an absolute divorce from her
husband upon the ground of habitual intemperance. The divorce decree
entered by the court required " 'that the defendant pay to the plaintiff
the sum of $50.00 on the first of each and every month . . . said payments
to continue until the remarriage of said plaintiff or her death. . . .' "I The
plaintiff's ex-husband died May 26, 1954; she made a claim against his es-
tate for alimony payments that accrued subsequent to his death. The
county court disallowed the claim, but the District Court of Cass County,
North Dakota, reversed the county court. In affirming the district court's
decision, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that since the statute
-2
1 Stoutland v. Stoutland, 103 N.W. 2d 286, 287 (N.D. 1960).
2 N.D. REv. CODE § 14-0524 (1943).
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authorized the court to make a suitable allowance to the other party for
support during "life," the term "life" meant that the alimony payments
to the wife were not to terminate with the death of her former husband.
Stoutland v. Stoutland, 103 N.W. 2d 286 (N.D. 1960).
Alimony "comes from Latin 'alimonia' meaning sustenance, and means,
therefore, the sustenance or support of the wife by her divorced husband.
• . ."3 Alimony had its origin in the English ecclesiastical courts. The
canon law allowed divorce to be granted from bed and board, i.e., divorce
a mensa et thoro. The divorce a mensa et thoro amounted to little more
than a judicial separation. Blackstone wrote: "In divorce a mensa et thoro,
the law allows alimony to the wife, which is that allowance made to a
woman out of her husband's estate, being settled at the discretion of the
ecclesiastical judge on considering the circumstance of the particular
case. ' 4 Therefore, under canon law, alimony was grounded on the con-
cept that in a divorce a mensa et thoro, the marriage relationship was
deemed to continue, and the husband had the duty to support his spouse.
Absolute divorce and alimony are creatures of statutory development
in the United States. With absolute divorce, the marital obiigation of sup-
port is terminated, and the husband's continued duty to support his
spouse is predicated on the divorce decree 5 The canon law concepts,
however, have pervaded the modern theory of alimony. In Bialy v.
Bialy,6 it was succinctly stated:
Alimony, by whatever authority it is conferred, is an incident of marriage, and
based upon the underlying principle that it is the duty of the husband to support
his wife, not necessarily to endow her. Primarily it signifies, not a certain por-
tion of his estate, but an allowance or allotment adjudged against him for her
subsistence, according to his means and their condition in life during their
separation, whether it be for life or for years. 7
Against this backdrop of historical development and concepts, the
American divorce law evolved. Accepting the basic concepts of canon
law, the general rule developed in the United States that a decree granted
in an absolute divorce case for regular periodical payments of alimony to
the wife for her maintenance and support, terminated at the husband's
death.8 Alimony is a personal obligation owed by a husband to his wife.
3 BLAcK, LAW DICrIONARY 97 (4th ed. 1951).
4 1 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 22 (3rd ed. 1884).
5 Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408, 75 N.E. 236 (1905).
6 167 Mich. 559, 133 N.W. 496 (1911). 7 Id. at 565-6, 133 N.W. at 499.
8 Van Sciver v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 88 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1956); Dickey v.
Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 At. 387 (1928); Hagen v. Hagen, 193 Ore. 369, 238 P. 2d 747
(1951); Wilson v. Wilson, 195 Va. 1060, 81 S.E. 2d 605 (1954); Foster v. Foster, 195 Va.
102, 77 S.E. 2d 471 (1953).
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The duty, being personal, lasts only for his lifetime, and with his death,
it terminates.9 Therefore, in Mead v. Mead,10 a decree allowing alimony
subsequent to the husband's death was held void on the ground that the
right to alimony is dependent upon the existence of a valid marriage. A
similar decision resulted in Daggett v. Commissioner," where the court
concluded that the New York courts lacked authority to decree alimony
for the life of the wife because to so decree would render the husband;s
estate liable where he predeceased his wife.
There are, however, a number of courts which have refused to follow
the general rule, and have concluded that the periodic alimony payments
due to the wife during her lifetime do not terminate with the death of the
ex-husband.12 Three basic trends of thought support the continuance of
payments: (1) express statutory authority, 3 (2) an intention expressed in
or circumstances surrounding the decree, 14 and (3) a consent decree or
an agreement of the parties incorporated in the decree.'
One group of courts, in order to continue payments after the ex-hus-
band's death, rely on statutory authority, i.e., a statute which expressly
authorizes the court to decree that such payments shall be paid to the
wife during her lifetime.' 6 A California statute provided that an allow-
ance could be made to "the wife for her support during her life." 17 The
California Supreme Court construed the latter to mean that the court
could order the payments for the life of the wife, and that they would not
necessarily cease with the husband's death.' 8
Even if this statutory power is had, the courts in many jurisdictions
will not allow alimony payments beyond the life of the ex-husband, un-
less the decree expresses such an intention.19 The decree must order the
9 Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408,75 N.E. 236 (1905).
10205 111. App. 327 (1917).
11 128 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1942).
12 Parsons v. Parsons' Estate, 70 Colo. 333, 201 Pac. 559 (1921); Cross v. Cross, 5 111. 2d
456, 125 N.E. 2d 488 (1955); Storey v. Storey, 125 Ill. 608, 18 N.E. 329 (1888); Lennahan
v. O'Keefe, 107 Il. 620 (1883); Farrington v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 280
Mass. 121, 181 N.E. 779 (1932); Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 33 N.W. 2d 30
(1948); DeRoche v. DeRoche, 12 N.D. 17, 94 N.W. 767 (1903); Murphy v. Shelton,
183 Wash. 180, 48 P. 2d 247 (1935); Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 Pac. 820 (1913).
'3 DeRoche v. DeRoche, 12 N.D. 17,94 N.W. 767 (1903).
14 Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398,33 N.W. 2d 30 (1948).
15 Parsons v. Parsons' Estate, 70 Colo. 333, 201 Pac. 559 (1921).
16DeRoche v. DeRoche, 12 N.D. 17, 94 N.W. 767 (1903).
17 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 139.
18 Ex pane Hart, 94 Cal. 254, 29 Pac. 774 (1892).
19 Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 33 N.W. 2d 30 (1948).
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payment of alimony "for the remainder of the life of the wife," or in
words of a like effect. 0 'lhese words will be deemed to show such an
intent.2' As one court put it:
[Ilf the judge intended that the payments were to cease with the death of the
libellee, it would be assumied that he would not have included in the decree a
phrase that the payments were to he made 'during the term of her life,' for it
could not be contended that in the absence of such a phrase they would continue
after the libellant's death, an(l hence its only function can be to show that the
payments are to continue during the libellant's life regardless of the death of the
libellee. The language of the decree indicates, an intent to bind the libellee's
estate. 22
From the very circumstances surrounding the decree, the court also con-
cluded that the intent was to continue the payments.2 3
Although the parties to a divorce action may not enter into an agree-
ment for divorce, a number of courts have held that the amount of ali-
mony and the terms of its payment may be provided for by the parties
themselves by consent 24 or by contract. 25' The court will embody their
agreement into the decree.2 6 The contract may be made even though
statutory authority be lacking to continue payments after the ex-hus-
band's death.27 The contract, however, must manifest an intent that the
payments are to survive the death of the spouse, and if the contract does
not manifest such an intent, the payments necessarily cease with the death
of the husband. 28
Illinois uses a "combination approach" for alimony allowed after the
ex-husband's death. 29 In decisions, the courts of Illinois suggest that they
follow the general rule that alimony payments terminate upon the death
of the husband because the payments "constituted a personal decree
against the defendant and did not affect his estate."8 0 However, if the Ian-
20 Storey v. Storey, 125 111. 608, 18 N.E. 329 (1888).
21 Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 33 N.. 2d 30 (1948).
22 Farrington v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 280 Mass. 121, 126, 181 N.E. 779,
781 (1932).
23 Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wash. 180,48 P. 2d 247 (1935).
24 Storey v. Storey, 121 Ill. 608, 18 N.E. 329 (1888).
25 Parsons v. Parsons' Estate, 70 Colo. 333, 201 Pac. 559 (1921).
26 Ibid.; Storey v. Storey, 121 Ill. 608, 18 N.E. 329 (1888).
27 Stratton v. Stratton, 77 Me. 373 (1885); Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash.- I84, 134 P. 820
(1913).
28 Parsons v. Parsons' Estate, 70 Colo. 333, 201 Pac. 559 (1921).
29 Cross v. Cross, 5IlU. 2d 456, 125 N.E. 2d 488 (1955); Storey v. Storey, 125 Ill. 608,
18 N.E. 329 (1888); Lennahan v. O'Keefe, 107 111. 620 (1883); Kramp v. Kramp, 2 Ill.
App. 2d 17, 117 N.E. 2d 859 (1954).
30 Kramp v. Kramp, 2 II. App. 2d 17, 21, 117 N.E. 2d 859, 861 (1954).
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guage of the decree awarding permanent alimony to the wife manifests
"unequivocally an intent" to bind the heirs of the husband after death,
the allowance of alimony will not terminate with the death of the hus-
band.3' Thus, "the court does have power to decree that alimony shall be
paid after the death of the spouse, and where the decree expressly so pro-
vides, it will be enforced and recognized .... ,,32 In Illinois, the situation
also presents itself whereby the parties to a divorce action can consent to
incorporate their agreement into the decree.33
Each of the two different views concerning alimony after the death of
the husband has its own particular disadvantages. In states where the rule
is that alimony terminates on the death of the husband, the wife who has
divorced the husband for his fault may after his death-no matter how
large his estate-find herself destitute. On the other hand, under the hold-
ings allowing payments after the husband's death, the estate of the hus-
band may be changed by or encumbered with the duty of support owing
to the ex-wife. The settlement of estates could thus be indefinitely pro-
longed, and funds belonging to the assets might have to be diverted, and
used to make provision for such support. Therefore, a court, in deciding
what rule to adopt, would seem to be limited to choosing between two
rules, both of which, as pointed out, are subject to certain inherent weak-
nesses.
31 Lennahan v. O'Keefe, 107 Ill. 620 (1883).
32 Cross v. Cross, S Il. 2d 456, 462, 125 N.E. 2d 488, 491 (1955).
33 Storey v. Storey, 125 111. 608, 18 N.E. 329 (1888).
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-U.S. SUPREME COURT HOLDS
THAT HUSBAND AND WIFE CAN BE GUILTY
OF CONSPIRACY
The defendants, husband and wife, were charged with conspiring to
illegally bring goods into the United States and thereafter to conceal
and transport the goods. The indictment charged the defendants with
violating section 371 of title 18 of the United States Code." The United
States District Court for the District of Southern California dismissed
the indictment on the grounds that it did not state an offense. The case
went to the United States Supreme Court on direct review. The Court, in
1 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (Supp. 1959), which provides: "If two or more persons conspire
either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined ......
(Emphasis added.) This section was enacted in connection with 18 U.S.C.A. S 545
(Supp. 1959), which deals with smuggling goods into the United States.
